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__________

Book Review: Kofi Annan and the Role of Morality in
International Relations
__________

Robert Potts1

It is difficult to think of a figure more closely tied up in the legacy of the modern United
Nations than former Secretary-General Kofi Annan. In his 2012 memoir, Interventions: A Life
in War and Peace, Annan recounts his time in the highest office of the United Nations (UN)
and pontificates on how he believes the organization must evolve to meet the continuing
needs of a modern world. His approach is to examine his time in the seat of the chief
diplomat through the lens of certain key events and the UN’s response to them. The
unsparing critique brings in many of the highest figures in international relations over the
past 20 years and is quick to cast blame anywhere Annan thinks it is due. Ultimately, the
book serves two purposes: (1) to shore up Annan’s legacy as secretary-general and, more
importantly, (2) to paint a path forward for an organization that many denounce as
anachronistic.
Kofi Annan is a child of decolonization. His father was an influential figure in the Gold
Coast Colony, holding an executive position in an Anglo-African corporation but also deeply
involved in the independence movement. Unlike political leaders such as Kwame Nkrumah,
Annan’s father, Henry Reginald Annan, was a gradualist and favored the slower progression
toward independence pushed by the British themselves. It can be said that Annan grew up in
a position of privilege compared to many in the contemporary Gold Coast society. He was
also surrounded by politics, specifically intense dialogue and negotiation, from a young age.
Annan’s generation came of age with the independence of the new state of Ghana and was
filled with idealism – a feeling quickly quashed by the realities of African post-colonial
statehood. For Annan personally, the devolution of Ghanaian government into dictatorship
led to the conclusion that: “working for the UN was the best way to serve [his] country and
[his] continent” (Annan 2012, 27). He moved from working in the UN offices in Geneva at
the lowest possible level, to serving in Addis Ababa, and eventually moving to New York
where he rose to the position of assistant secretary general for peacekeeping operations
before his elevation to the UN’s highest position. He was the first sub-Saharan African to
1
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serve in this capacity and also the first to have come of age in the era of decolonization – a
massive perspective shift for the organization as a whole.
Interventions covers a period of Annan’s career beginning with the seminal events leading
up to his elevation to the Secretary-Generalship and continues covering a couple significant
conflicts in which he was involved following the expiration of his term. The book analyses
international responses to crises in which Annan played some kind of role, such as the
Rwandan Genocide and the AIDS epidemic. It does acknowledge areas in which Annan is a
more controversial figure particularly, for example, the Oil-for-Food Program scandal of the
early 2000s. It seems clear that the book has a subsidiary purpose of shoring up Annan’s
reputation in rebutting his alleged involvement. Ultimately, the work revolves around
Annan’s vision for necessary transformation to keep the U.N. a relevant organization into
the new century. As Secretary-General he pioneered the adoption of the “Responsibility to
Protect” doctrine government UN interventions, refocusing efforts from simply mediating
conflicts to protecting basic human rights. His efforts focus on a fundamental conviction
that the people of the world are the group that the UN ultimately ought to serve, not the
self-interested member states.
Annan is at his strongest in recounting the inner-workings of international politics. He is
as adept a diplomat in his writing as in his political work, providing compelling insight into
the operations of an incredibly complex and often misunderstood organization. Looking
back, it is easy to ascribe blame to the UN for failure to respond in devolving situations such
as Rwanda or for not committing sufficient resources to truly follow through on its idealistic
promises such as the Millennium Development Goals. Such tactics frequently appear in the
media outlets of developed countries like the United States, but they remain fuelled by a
general lack of knowledge about how the UN must operate within its sphere. Bill Gates,
founder of Microsoft and noted philanthropist, particularly lauded this aspect of Annan’s
memoir, noting that: “For anybody who wants to understand the complexities of the role of
the Secretary General, this book is an illuminating read” (Gates 2013). In this sense, the
memoir could be interpreted as a continuation of the legacy of Annan’s UN tenure — an
attempt to humanize the largely bureaucratic and outmoded organization. For the people of
the world to understand how the UN can help them, they must also understand the manner
in which it functions and how they might seek to utilize its force for their betterment. A
recurring statement that Annan makes quite convincingly is that the UN is not purposively
for its member states, but it gains its legitimacy and ability to act from their consent. This
simple reality is often a misunderstood fundamental concept restricting UN action. A failure
to act is more likely the result of a lack of international consensus rather than a problem
endemic to the organization, by Annan’s argument.
This explanatory function connects quite closely to Annan’s core criticisms of the
organization he served and its member states. He shines in denouncing the unwillingness of
individual governments to commit the necessary resources for the UN to pursue its
mandates, a consummate Secretary General even eight years removed from his tenure. True
to his focus on the people and not the government, Annan presents an idealized vision of
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UN Peacekeeping. In doing so, he puts forward one of the most candid and powerful
statements about the purpose of his organization and collective deficiency in its execution:
Entering any arena of conflict, with its blue helmets and white vehicles and a
flag symbolizing far more powerfully than any words shelter from the storm,
the UN was making a solemn pledge: we have come to keep the peace. This
was our commitment, and perhaps our greatest failure was never fully to
grasp the enormity of this obligation (Annan 2012).
Annan’s tenure in the high offices of the UN included some of the worst atrocities of the
20th century such as Srebrenica and Rwanda. Interventions does not shy away from this fact
and a certain degree of retrospection shows that these failures weigh heavily on Annan’s
mind. It explains the politics behind many decisions that had tragic human repercussions,
but denounces these politics in remarkably strong words for a diplomat. In a tone as close to
disapproval as one will find in this memoir, Annan emphatically states that, “to a man,
woman, or child for whom the presence of a blue helmet is all that lies between safety and
certain death, talk of limited mandates, inadequate means, under-resourced missions —
however accurate — is, at best, beside the point, at worst, a betrayal” (Annan 2012, 10-11).
Throughout the work this theme is echoed; the argument that fundamental responsibility for
failure to act rests on member states’ intransigence is strong and consistent. This
denunciation is indeed one of Annan’s better points and well developed throughout the
work.
However there is an inherent weakness, in the fact that Annan leaves the blame entirely
on the member states without apportioning some to the UN itself and its leadership. Indeed,
throughout the work Annan is careful to avoid accepting any personal responsibility, either
individually or ex officio for the Secretariat. He recognizes and speaks convincingly of his of
the problems regarding member state involvement and a need to change this for moral
reasons, but is in many cases quiet about the role of UN bureaucracy in the same areas.
Nowhere does this become apparent than in the chapter on Rwanda -- a horrific event that
unfolded while Annan was Assistant Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations.
When questioned about the series of events leading up to Rwandan Genocide, Annan’s
response has not changed in twenty years; he firmly holds that: “the problem had been in the
international community’s collective refusal to act, through the UN in particular” (Annan
2012, 74). It is undeniable that the member states’ failure to adequately outfit the UN
Assistance Mission for Rwandan Genocide (UNAMIR) and later disinclination to involve
themselves in the unfolding conflict created serious problem, but Annan also admits to a key
instance of personal fault: prior to the onset of the genocide, Annan’s Department of
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) office received a telegram from Lt. Gen. Romeo Dallaire,
the Canadian officer in charge of UNAMIR, stating that there were plans for genocide and
that UNAMIR had planned a raid on an arms cache, which was to be used in the executions.
His response was to refuse Dallaire this request, stating that, “the overriding consideration
being ‘the need to avoid entering into a course of action that might lead to the use of force

https://digitalcommons.library.umaine.edu/tcj/vol1/iss1/5

4

Potts: Book Review: Kofi Annan and the Role of Morality in International

and unanticipated repercussions’” (Annan 2012, 53). The next several pages are spent trying
to justify this telegram, arguing that UNAMIR was inadequately equipped and that with
Somalia fresh on all minds involved, they were not prepared to risk the lives of
peacekeepers. Ultimately, Annan attempts to bring the blame back around be saying that,
“the reason for this was clear to all: there was no appetite whatsoever in the Security Council
to even consider the use of force in a peacekeeping mission…” (Annan 2012, 55). This
argument remains not wholly convincing and Dallaire has since made a point to publicly
protest that the genocide was functionally preventable but for DPKO refusal to sanction his
planned arms raid. This is also the point on which many of Annan’s sharpest critics emerge.
Rory Stewart, a British Member of Parliament, shows Annan’s sequence of events in a
different light; he points out that, “[Annan] accepts responsibility for not contacting the
Security Council. But having made the case against himself, Annan does not apologize. Nor
does he blame a lack of international will to intervene” (Stewart 2012). Stewart does well to
remind that the Security Council did not refuse to help, Annan chose to refuse Dallaire’s
request and not even inform the council.
One of the more interesting critiques of Annan’s work is a short review by Michael
Ignatieff. In it, he sharply criticizes Annan for relying too much on moral prestige and the
fundamental ideals of the UN rather than credible force. He points to one of Annan’s
admissions in the aftermath of the Rwandan Genocide episode as among the most damning,
namely the statement that, “[UNAMIR] was a peacekeeping force, sent in a deliberately weak
and vulnerable form to engender the trust of both sides, which emerged as even weaker in
reality due to the challenges of finding troops and equipment” (Annan 2012, 75-76). This is
an illuminating response with regard to Annan’s typical pattern of assigning blame. It grants
a certain degree of fault to the member states that failed to adequately supply UNAMIR, but
it also indicates that the force was intentionally weak beyond that limitation.
It is quite clear throughout Annan’s work that he is a firm believer in the moral power of
the UN This exact situation makes it exceptionally clear, though, how flawed that view is
when functioning in a real world situation. As Ignatieff astutely notes: “When moral prestige
deludes itself into thinking it need not arm itself, it can make itself an accomplice to evil”
(Ignatieff 2012). Annan admits freely all throughout Interventions that he is a firm believer
in the moral prestige of the UN; his series of actions leading up to the genocide in Rwanda
seem to validate Ignatieff’s assertion and lay some degree of blame at Annan’s feet, a charge
he steadfastly continues to refuse. Throughout his career, though, Annan regularly exhibited
what can only be described as, “dismaying faith in the deterrent force of good intentions”
(Ignatieff 2012). While he often attributes the cause to intransigence on the part of the
international community, Annan has with very few exceptions never been one to speak
softly but carry a big stick, as U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt famously quipped.
As Annan recounts the various successes and tragedies of his twenty or so years in high
UN leadership, he consistently argues for the same points. He seeks to remind UN members
the true affiliation of the UN is to its constituent people, not their governments. More
importantly, he pushes for an evolution of the U.N. as a body, expressly stating that, “the
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aim is to alter the balance of power between state and citizen” (Annan 2012). While Annan
is part of a small group in the high echelons of international power pushing for such a shift,
he is quite convincing in his part. Ignatieff explains this particular trend well, suggesting that
Annan: “can be seen as an entrepreneur of moral standards, promoting new ideas of
collective behavior, sovereign responsibility, and international criminal accountability for a
world that briefly believed that globalization might bring us together” (Ignatieff 2012).
Throughout his tenure in the UN, Annan was careful to cultivate a deep sense of morality
and push the organization to accept new ideas. In line with this thinking, he spearheaded the
push for the Millennium Development Goals and transitioned peacekeeping to accept the
new Responsibility to Protect. He succinctly links many of the policy positions undertaken
throughout his tenure as Secretary-General to support this fundamental idea of progress.
The urgently needed paradigm shift that forms the core argument underlying Annan’s
memoir is one with which the average person would be hard-pressed to disagree. His
suggested new UN regime is focused on the protection and assurance of basic human rights.
The stumbling blocks emerge when member states are forced to make sacrifices for this to
happen, when a longstanding traditional world order is upended in support of the rights of
the least of humanity. Nowhere is this quite so firmly seen as in the landmark adoption of
the Responsibility to Protect doctrine by U.N. member states. Annan describes this new idea
in simple terms with an easily comprehensible benchmark; he declares that: “Ultimately, the
success of our efforts on the question of intervention should not be measured in wars
launched or sanctions imposed but in lives saved” (Annan 2012, 114). Sanctions and military
incursions were a longstanding reality of international affairs and Annan does not suggest
they are going to disappear, but recognizes that by looking at them one analyzes the wrong
metric. This statement in and of itself is on balance uncontroversial.
The Responsibility to Protect does not stop there, however. In Annan’s own words, it is
an attempt to reimagine the very definition of sovereignty that has accompanied nationstates from their inception. He holds that the legitimacy of the UN in the eyes of the peoples
of the world rested on, “the question of whether we were dedicated, not to the power of
states but to saving lives and defending the human rights of individuals” (Annan 2012, 115).
In pushing the Responsibility to Protect, Annan believed that the answer to this question lay
in changing the expectations of states. His ultimate goal was to create a world in which,
“States bent on criminal behavior knew frontiers were not the absolute defense,” that they
were held to be in the past (Annan 2012, 115). Annan’s vision of a new U.N. that was not
state-centric, but people-centric means a fundamental reimagining of the principle of state
sovereignty more dramatic than any other in world history. Throughout the work, though,
he is cogent and convincing as to why this is a necessity for the modern world.
Annan is a remarkable figure that dominated the top echelons of international politics
for almost two decades. He was a visionary and a moralist, one who saw his organization as
flawed and sought to reform it. Even twenty years after the fact, he refuses to outright
accept blame for his role in the international response to events such as the Rwandan
Genocide. He can also claim remarkable successes in diplomatic resolution, which he is
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quick to share with anyone deserving a piece of credit. On the whole, his memoir is less
about this legacy than about a vision for the future. He knows what his past record is and he
must live with the consequences, but he genuinely seeks to create a world in which the global
community will respond to crises better than it did in his time. In this aim, Interventions is a
resounding success; Annan’s weaknesses emerge in reckoning with the past, but his strengths
are looking forward to a brighter tomorrow.
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